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Screen Violence 
The continual "cultural wars" between "Generation X" 
("baby busters" whose birth years begin with 1961, aged 11-35), 
and New Right "baby boomers" (whose birth years range. from 
1946 to 1960) I around the issue of violence as represented m the 
popular cult~ral forms of film and television provide critically 
concerned art educators with an opportune moment to examme 
how conservative rhetoric has made "moral panic" an object of 
current discourses.' This highly-charged debate, now literally 
and symbolically represented by the censorship that "V-~hip" 
technology provides,' is explored in this essay from a se.emmgly 
non-populist position given the curren~ tide agamst the 
proliferation of violence. It is argued ~hat the Issues that surround 
violence veil broader socia-economIC concerns. 
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Tank Girl (Rachel Talalay, 1995), the comic book cult-figure 
come alive on the big screen -starring Lori Petty in the lead 
role-was for all intents and purposes a flop in the eyes of 
(adult) media critics, claiming it to be just too silly and 
preposterous. In this film, the pseudo-punk heroine of "girlie" 
culture,' both literally and figuratively covets a remnant of the 
IThe term Generation X, or the so caned "13th generation," is taken 
from Neil Howe & Bill Strauss' 13th Generation: Abort, Retry, Ignore, Fail? (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1993). It is not meant to be applied to a predominantly 
white middle class Utwentysomething" consumer crowd. Rather it is a genera-
tion IIthat reaches across the board-rich and poor
l 
black and white, Hispanic 
and Asian, male and female, celebrity and everyman .... Babies born between 
1961 and 1964 are tired of hearing themselves called 'baby boomers' when they 
know they don't carry the usual hippie-cum-yuppie baggage" (p.12). Further-
more, not all "boomersll are conservative and right leaning. I am referring to 
those boomers who define themselves as the "moral majority," as well as those 
who look "back to the future" for school reform. In art education, the figure of 
Ralph Smith whose "excellence" crusade regarding art educational curricula 
would qualify for such a categorization. 
2Moral panic has now become the key psychological mood of 
postmodern culture. See Arthur Kroker, Marilouise Kroker and David Cook. 
Panic Encyclopedia: Tile Definitive Guide 10 tile Poslmodern Scene. (Montreal: New 
World Perspectives, 1989). 
3Since the writing of this essay President Clinton has signed a bill on 
February 11, 1996 mandating that every television set manufactured must be 
equipped with V-microchip technology which would allow parents to censor 
violence on network programming. The V-chip automatically blocks out pro-
gramming that exceeds predetermined levels of violence, sexuality amnd 
coarse language as seen fit by the private whims of the household's "moral 
guardians." Invented by a Canadian from Calgary, the V-chip received early 
approval by Keith Spicer, the chairman of the Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunications (eRTC) who has been in the forefront of pushing the U.S. 
to "chip in" (to) Canada's effort at eliminating gratuitous violence from televi-
sion. 
4"Girlie" culture refers to a specific performative posture (d. Judith 
Butler's Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. [New York: 
Routledge, 1990]) by teenage girls against the adult world whereby the dual-
isms of bitch/whore are played with as "subversion as affirmation." Although 
Madonna may well be the paradigm case of this posturing it is in the "girlie" 
music industry where this is most evident with such groups as Shampoo-Pop, 
the GO-GO's, and especially thevideosof Heather Novas and Juliana Hatfields. 
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male's technical phallus' by occupying its drive~'s seat. With it 
she roams over both a figural (i.e., moral) and hteral desert In 
the post-apocalyptic world of 2033 where parents play no role 
hat-so-ever. This tough-girl image, with a life-style wedded to 
:ex, drugs, and violence, is the very exemplar of what the "new" 
American and Canadian conservahsm (by the early 1990s, over 
a decade old!) rails against: "a youth in crisis." The more 
s ec(tac)lllar aspects of this "crisis"-teen crime as teenage 
!ntertainment ("kill for thrills"), teen delinq~ency, teen 
pregnancies, teen suicide, demon and Satan worship, gang a.nd 
cult involvement-have been mobilized by the neo-conser.v~hve 
Right for the artieulation of a moral panic (i.e., a felt ~rlSls, or 
"affective epidemic" of a general societal breakdown). 
The counter-hegemonic activity of struggle (Le., the logiC 
of the contingent social for drawing the line b~tween. state and 
civil society) takes place in any number of l?c~t\Ons-m law, the 
market place, the family, the school-but It IS popular cultu~e 
that is especially an important place for a conjunctural analYSIS 
51 am using the term "phallus" in the Lacanian s.ens~ as that sig~ifier 
which is empty (Le., has no signification other than as acting In the capacIty of 
a transcendental signifier that holds the system together). It must be noted that 
the status of the phallus is a fraud. It cannot be attained. PsychIC castration 
occurs when its fraudulence is unveiled. , . . 
6" Affective epidem.ic" is Lawrence Gr~ssbe~g 5 term ~or a fetishlzed 
and mobilized site/Sight/cite that is invested With a dlsproporhonatevalue ~s 
to what it is worth, which is then saturated daily by panics. For example, ~IVlS 
can still attract necrophilic fascination because he ~as always a promohon~l 
simulacrum who could be wrapped around any passmg mood See Grossberg s 
We Golla Get OutofThis Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture.(N~w 
York: Routledge, 1992), p. 284. In the British context, A~gela McRobbl~,dlS­
cusses the crucial role that moral panics play in conservative po,htIcs. See The 
Moral Panic in the Age of the Postmodern Media," Postmodernlsm and Popl~lar 
Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). In the German-Austnan 
context, moral panic is localized against the National Front as. r~prese~t~d by 
neo-Fascist youth groups. See Dieter Baacke, Michaela Their, ChrIstian Gr~nmger 
and Frank Lindemann's Rock Von Rechts: Medienpadagogische Handrelchung 
3, Scltriften zlIr Medienpadagogik 14. 
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where the ideas about the world, and the forms of their expression 
are made, transformed, and circulated.7 Although the dispersed 
and heterogeneous nature of the popular is difficult to capture, 
since it includes the print media as well, it has been particularly 
the "screen violence" of television and film that has become the 
specific site/cite/sight of critici~m by any number of right-
wing, moral-majority groups to try and maintain their hegemony 
through crisis.' Here the simple formula that attributes direct 
imitation to screen violence rules: a "monkey see, monkey do" 
syndrome which is as old as Plato's complaint against Athenian 
youth (boys, that is) who were said to be unable to distinguish 
the difference between what was allegorical and what was literal. 
The common sense formula that youth simply mimic and identify 
unproblematicly with screen characters, especially the violent 
ones, or are easily persuaded by the "satanic" lyrics of rock 'n' 
roll, remains the bedrock argument of the Right to mobilize 
moral unease and indignation. In other words, according to this 
tired argument, youth easily mix up reality with fiction. They 
are incapable of distinguishing between media modalities, like 
7 The language of articulation, hegemony, overdetermination, and 
conjunction is that of Antonio Gramsci as utilized by Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics (London: Verso, 1985). It should be pointed out immediately that the 50 
called hegemonic "struggle" is a complex process which involves pressure 
groups and self-help groups that counter and contest the vocalily of the 
traditional moral guardians of the Right by directly influencing the media. 
There is no clearly defined moral panic but a "media flow" of debate between 
them. See Angela McRobbie, 1992. The complexity is captured by James 
Davison Hunter's Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: Basic 
Books, 1992). I use the term "popularculture" to avoid any misunderstanding 
that this is to be equated with "mass media" which assumes that audiences are 
the dupes of its ideological effects. Rather, what makes a text (film, television 
sit-com, series, soap opera etc.) popular is its ability to be polysemic in its 
interpretative possibilities. A text's survival based on its ratings and economic 
return relies on the measure of its wide appeal. 
8 In the interests of space I wish only to quickly pOint to the magnitude 
of this pressure and its longstanding history. In the 'SOsand early '60s television 
programs like Dragnet and The Untouchables were criticized for encouraging 
teenage delinquency. In the '705, Peggy Charren, the founder of Action for 
Children's Television in the United States, lobbied to set limits on the advertis-
ing time allowed during children's programs. More recently, U.s, Senator Paul 
Simon has led a crusade against TV violence, while U.s. Attorney General Janet 
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news violence from cartoon violence, for instance. An ideology of 
protection (most commonly in the form of censorship) is then 
mobilized "for their own good" as the Swiss psychoanalyst 
Alice Miller so succinctly put it in the title of one of her books.' 
Usually a sensational murder committed by an adolescent (the 
general rule here being the younger the killer, and the more 
heinous the crime, the more sensational and dramatic will be its 
rhetorical effects) is promptly linked to some horror film, 
television· program, fantasy game or war toy that the teen 
murderer has recently seen, or fantasized which consequently 
influenced the crime through its powerful imagery. A causal 
link is then posited, even when months later after the teen's trial 
it was found that the alleged horror film(s) had not been 
involved." 
Reno has threatened the movie and television industries with anti-violence 
legislation unless they clean up their acts voluntarily. Terry Rakolta of Ameri-
cans for Responsible Television sees TV as the only thing that can be controlled 
since drugs and education can"t be, thus making television thescapegoat for all 
of society's ills. As recently as August 1995, President Clinton has seriously 
thought of endorsing a V-chip-a device that would block out incoming 
programs that have a high "V" for violence rating. (The U.S. National Coalition 
on Television Violence lists such acts as grabbing and shoulder tapping as 
violent acts, making the definition of violence almost a meaningless task.) In 
Canada, a new anti-violence code has been put in place, with CRTC Chairman 
Keith Spicer also thinking about endorsing the V-chip, making parents instant 
censors. In England, Mary Whitehouse is Britain's leading moral majority 
campaigner who made headlines by attacking the soap opera EaslEnders for its 
excessive verbal abuse. For the British situation on the campaign against 
television violence see David Buckingham, CI,ildren Talking Television: The 
Making of Television Literacy (London and WaShington, D.C.: The Falmer Press, 
1993), pp. 3-14. In Germany, France, and Austria there have been similar 
lobbies against excessive violence. Austria is public television ORF introduced 
more restrictive measures in 1993. Surprisingly, northern countries such as 
Sweden and Norway have always had tough measures regarding screen 
violence whereas pornography and nudity have no censorship. 
9 Alice Miller, For Tlreir Own Good (New York: Farrar, Straus, 
Giroux, 1984). Miller is best known for her development of "schwartz 
pedagogy" which argues that many educators inadvertently do more 
damage than good because they remain insensitive to the curriculum 
as seem through the eyes of their students. 
10 This happened with the famous case concerning the killing of 2 
year-old James Bulger by two 10 year-old boys in England in February 1993. It 
was claimed that the two youths had been influenced by the horror film ClIild 
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Why adults .are not affected in the same way as teenagers by 
sc~e~~vlOle~ce IS attributed to their enhanced discriminating 
abIlllIes; then stronger fortitude and moral fiber. They are said 
to be more responsible citii'ens since they are "grown up." 
However, a common finding by media researchers is an effect 
kno.wn as "developmental disdain" or the "third person effect." 
While adults claim that youth are unable to psychically protect 
themselves fr?m the effects of simulated violence, they 
themselves claIm to be immune. I I This same common sense 
Play 3 which one of the boy's father had rented. Several months later it was 
discovered that no such tape was ever rented. In Canada, the Montreal Massa-
ere where a gunman, Marc Lepine, shot and killed fourteen women in the Ecole 
P~lytechnique in 1991, was attributed to his anti-feminism; his actions were 
said to be prompted by the media violence he watched. The Montreal based 
anti-violence group known as Pacijou staged the creation of an outdoor sculp-
ture where over 12,000 toy guns, and GI Joe figures were collected from 
schooIchildren,heape? on a pile, and unveiled. on the second anniversary of the 
massacre. In a recent film, Tile Program (1993), about the vigors of making it on 
a college football. tea~, several of the team members lie vertically, one after the 
other, on the whIte hne that separates traffic on a busy highway, as cars whiz 
past them by o~ both sides. It is both a dare and a way to "pump" themselves 
up f~r ~he.ensuIng game. The week following the films release, three deaths and 
four InJunes were reported throughout the United States as boys tried to mimic 
the prank. The scene was subsequently cut from the film. Stories such as these 
make it appear that there is a direct correlation between acts of murder and 
playing with war toys, Or that exposure to high school pranks will be imitated 
so~ewhere, som~time. Stories of juvenile murder appear regularly that are 
a~tnbuted to medIa, war toys or dangerous mind games. Ronald Lampasi killed 
hiS stepfather and wounded his mother in 1983. Then at the age of sixteen he 
claimed he was acting out a scenario from the fantasy game Dungeons and 
Dra~ons. :his was fo~lowed by the concern about the effects of the game and its 
r~laho~shlp to Satanlsm. For an opposing view see George Gerbner, "Televi-
sion VIOlence: The Power and the Peril." In Gender, Race and Class in Media, eds. 
Gail Di~es and Jean M. Humez (Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage 
Publica hans, 1995), pp.547-557, and Alison Bass, "DoSlasher Films Breed Real-
Life Violence?", pp. 185-189, same volume. Bass cites numerous incidents a-nd 
"evidence" that there is a direct cause between screen violence and the execu-
tion of violent crimes. 
. 11 Another variation of this "third person ('ffeet" is pointed out by 
DaVid Sholle when teaching media education. He finds that often adults and 
students are willing to he critical of media texts pointing to the surface 
effects of sexism, racism, hyper-patriotism, but then it turns out that it is 
always "other people" who are manipulated by the media, and not "them." 
~e Pet~r McLaren, Rhonda Hammer, David Sholle, & Susan Reilly, Retllink-
Ing MedIa Literacy: A Critical Pedagogy of Representation ( New York: Peter 
Lang, 1995), p. 240. 
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prejudice, in fact, occurs all the way down the various age 
differentiations amongst siblings. The older teenagers claim 
that their younger brothers and sisters should not be watching 
screen violence because they will begin to mimic it, while they 
themselves are more mature and immune, needing no such 
"protection." Within their logic The Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles 
all of a sudden are a bad influence since their younger siblings 
are said never to have engaged in karate kicking before the 
advent of the series. That aggressive behavior and conflict 
resolution is part of children's play culture is not given the 
weight that it deserves. Rather, alarmist and spectacular incidents 
such as "swarming" and "bullying" are singled out as instances 
of increased violence on the playground which are blamed on 
televised influences. 
It would require the dissemination of an enormous amount 
of statistical data, which claims that there has been an actual 
decrease in violent crime, before there would be any change in 
the spectacular perceptions that have been already mobilized. 
Despite some increases in violent crimes committed by juveniles 
in the 1980s, the aggregate arrest rates for serious violent offenses 
and for serious property offenses committed by U.S. adolescents 
have declined since the mid-1970s. A U.S. Congress report points 
out that only a small subset of adolescent offenders commit 
multiple serious offenses.' 2 Likewise, there was no actual rise in 
adolescent crime during the '50s to precipitate the kind of 
vociferous public response witnessed in the form of debates 
concerning censorship, television effects, comic books, and rock 
'n' roll.' 3 And while female arrest rates due to criminal behavior 
have gone up statistically, there is no way of knowing whether 
this has been due to the changes in attitude toward women in 
general, or whether there has been an increase in the number of 
12 As reported by U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. 
Adolescent HeaWI: Background and the Effectiveness of Selected Prevention and 
Treatment Services. Vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, November, 1991), p. 591. In 
Charles R. Acland, YOUt/I, Murder, Spectacle: The Cu/tural Politics of "Youth in 
Crisis" (Boulder, San FranCisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p. 8. 
13 James Burkhart Gilbert, A Cycle afOutrage: America's Reaction to the 
Juvenile Delinquency in the 19505 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), and 
Thomas Doherty, Teenagers and Teenpics: The /uvenilization of American Movies in 
tile 19505 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988). 
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crimes women commit. And while homicide is the leading cause 
of death amongst African-Americans aged fifteen to nineteen, is 
this higher incidence of African-American violent crime a marker 
of cultural difference, or raJher is it representative of differential 
policing methods? Again, the answer is open to speculation as to 
the "work" (policies, actions) the statistical evidence is meant to 
mobilize. If nonnuclear families contribute to a decrease in 
parental supervision of children, are they then contributing to 
juvenile crime? The use of statistical crime figures to incite panic 
against contemporary youth who are compared unfavorably to 
a previous "golden age" where social stability and strong moral 
discipline acted as a deterrent for delinquency and disorder has 
historically been a typical ploy of conservatives. In fact, when 
scrutiny is applied to such claims, no "golden age" has ever been 
found." 
While it is only the extremely pathologically ill teens who 
are unable to distinguish "reality" from fiction (i.e., teens who 
spend an excessive amount of time watching television which 
can result in the atrophy of their imaginations,15 living in 
impossible home conditions where heroine addiction and 
parental neglect are sickeningly obvious) these sensational 
exceptions have become the neo-conservative Right's way to 
discipline and keep youth under surveillance by presenting 
such instances as if they were normative everyday occurrences. 
In this way the breakdown of traditional forms of authority, 
patriarchy, law and order, and the institutions of their 
enforcement like the school, church, and the traditional family, 
receive the status of renewed leadership and moral guidance. 
And although it is youth in general who are being targeted" in 
the United States, the threat of youth has been specifically and 
14 The classic work here is Stan Cohen's Folk Devils and Moral Pallics: 
The Creation of the Mods and Rockers (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1972), and 
Geoff Pearson's Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears (London: Macmillan, 
1983). 
15 The "magical number" that is said to fry a kid's brains is set at 
twenty-five hours of television viewing or more a week. See Dorothy G. and 
Jerome L. Singer, The House 0] Make-Believe: Play and the Developing Imagination 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990). If the Nielsen figures 
show that the American child born into a home watches an average of 7 hours 
a day, then virtually all kid's brains have already been fried! 
16 In Bruno Bettelheim's terms the "generation gap" exists only as a 
time of youth dis-ease and economic non-profitability. Sec Bruno Bcttelheim, 
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symbolically centralized to African~American ~nd H~spanic­
American youth. The African-Amencan youth IS the mter~al 
Other that defines a threat to the stability of the Amencan social 
order, much like the neo-Nazis youth groups are the internal 
Other in Germany and Austria, while the Hooligans playa 
similar role in Britain. The films of African-American film makers: 
Spike Lee's Do the Rig/II Thing (1989) and Malcolm X (1992),John 
Singleton's Boyz N the Hood (1991) and Poetic Justice (1993~, a~d 
Mario Van Peebles's New Jack City (1991) were said to inCite 
violence amongst youth audiences. Rumors circulated that.act~al 
fights and squabbles broke out in the theaters upon theu fust 
screening. In Howe & Strauss' 17 "flip-hip" description of the 
Generation X, it is quite clear that the threat of. disorder IS 
coming from this New Jack antiworId. Gangster rap IS packaged, 
commodified and then bought up by a large population of white 
youth who identify with its celebrati~n of sex, violence, and 
rebelliousness. Their descnptlOn succinctly captures the fear 
that is spread. 
New Jack 13ers perceive an outside world that does 
not like them, does not want them, does not trust 
them, and (as they see it) has nothing to offer them. 
Glancing across at the financial towers and suburban 
influence that few of them will ever touch, New Jackers 
shed even the most basic social conventions that mark 
a civilized society. Hear them rap a melodyless cant of 
sexism, racism, and soulless mayhem, celebrating the 
very nihilism that older generations blame them for. 
"The Problem of Generations." In The Challenge of Youth, ed. Erik H. Erikson 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 76-109. 
17Howe and Strauss' book on the 13th generation (Generation X) is a 
literal compendium of Joel Schumacher's Falling Down, (1993), where .0-
FENDS (Michael Douglas) turns psychotic ar:d begi~~ killing off everythm~ 
that middle-America perceives as a threat to Its stability: Koreans who can t 
speak proper English, grocery prices that a~e too high: r~ads that are.under 
constant repair, gang members who harass Innocent Vl~tllns, neD-NaZIS who 
foster hate, the hypocritical hospitality of fast food estabhshments, the ostenta-
tious display of wealth (private golf courses and huge homes) by wealthy 
business men and plastic surgeons. Howe and Strauss write as if the moralizing 
Baby-Boomers want to eliminate 13ers in the same way as D-FENDS by 
describing the scene/seen from the 13er's point of view. Unusual. 
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Watch them swagger around in symbolic uniforms-
backwards caps, shades, leather jackets, combat 
fatigues, pump-sneakers, or jackboots-that conjure 
up the soul-dead violence of robots. Avoid them as 
their thug-armies rampage"for random victims. Hand 
them the keys-quick-when they carjack you. Fear 
them as they commit "opportunity crimes" against 
random passerby, or "hate crimes" against women, 
gays, or Asian shopkeepers, or "business crimes" 
against each other. Shoot them down, ship them out, 
lock them up. If you can catch them. And you'll never 
catch all of them.1s 
In Henry Louis Gates, Jr. words: "When you're faced with a 
stereotype, you can disavow it or you can embrace it and 
exaggerate it to the nth degree. The rappers take the white 
Western culture's worst fear of black men and make a game out 
of it. "19 
Trash and Talk: The Medias of Support 
The articulation of the object(s) of moral panic is 
overdetermined by a number of other media discourses besides 
feature length films and television's simulated killings which 
criss-cross and reinforce each other constantly to sustain an 
affective media impact, and to keep the "youth crisis" current 
and reprodUcible. Foremost among these supportive media 
industries has been "trash TV" (A Current Affair, America's Most 
Wanted) and daytime "confessional" television talk-shows. In 
the former case, the pursuit of America's "most wanted," and 
the exhibition of what is sold as various perversities and 
aberrations, is staged in a realistic style which tries to achieve a 
documentary realism that blurs the distinction between it and 
"actual" news reportage. This effect is achieved by using High 
8, hand held video cameras; mobile, on-location shooting using 
18 Ibid., p. 121. 
19 Ibid., p. 140. 
",'"'-"""~--------------------------
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natural lighting; actual policemen and policewomen; and 
"natural" actors as criminals, along with documentary newsreel 
evidence to further strengthen its modality." 
"Confessional" talk-shows present the other symbolic 
"nodal point" for the articulation of violence.' I The show's host 
introduces topics and themes that provide a stamp of authenticity 
to the social crisis by way of bodily displays such as tears and 
emotional outbursts. Guests are invited to relate (confess) their 
personal tragedy to a studio audience. The confessionary mode is 
offered more for its exhibitionary value; it is the act or 
performance that is proffered." Guests' confessions are 
communication acts that affirm, articulate and capture something, 
a pseudo-materiality" that is "shared" in a culture-about 
20 Modality, as the perceived reality of the content, can be character-
ized as being very weak (i.e., artificial like a cartoon strip), or very strong (i.e., 
like the news). See Bob Hodge and David Tripp, Children and Television: A 
Semiotic Approach (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), pp. 126-131. The speetaele 
and allure of trash television was meant to be ironically and socially critiqued 
by Oliver Stone's recent Nalural Born Killers (1994) where, in the tradition of 
Bonnie and Clyde, two psychotic killers-Micky and Mallory Knox as Genera-
tion X representatives (both of whom are products of abusive families) become 
media stars with the nation as their fan dub watching the chase on the news. The 
character of Morton Downey, Jr., who was once considered the king of trash TV, 
appears as a reporter in Stone's film whose broadcast M & M Murders is a mise-
en-abime of his once successful New York late night talk show. Stone presents 
Morton Downey, Jr:s charader as a self-serving, ego-grabbing, arrogant tele-
vision host who will do anything to boost ratings by interviewing II America's 
Most Wanted." Ironically his character is played by Michael Downey, Jr. 
21 Laclau and Mouffe (1985) utilize this Lacanian term to designate 
locations where a number of 1/ floating signifiers" tha t circulate in an ideological 
field are temporarily sewn together. Each nodal point harbors a "master-
signifier." 
22 The confessional mode as developed from the Church discourse 
and introduced into the modernist discourses of science (Le., anthropology, 
ethnography, psychiatry) was first developed by Michel Foucault, especially in 
his Tlte History ofSexualily: An Introduction. Vol. 1. Trans. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 
23 This pseudo-materiality which subverts the classic ontological 
oppositions of reality and illusion is worked out by Jacques Derrida. See his 
Spectres de Marx (Paris: Galilee, 1993), pp. 25-36. 
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deviance, t~ansgression, and the emotion of guilt. 
PsychoanalYl1cally speakmg, these confessions embod y the very 
!hing24 a society is unable to express symbolically, which is its 
spectral. sU~I;le~ent" or '~pectral apparition."" The Thing as a 
Master-SlgmfIer (I.e., as a sIgnifier without a signified) is that 
so~et"ing about which the confessors need not make any positive 
claIms. Spectral apparitions are foreclosed from such talk. So 
whether the talk is about illicit affairs, divorce rates freaks 
serial killers, gangster rap, etc. as what are taken t~ be th~ 
current societal. e~emplars of moral panic, the ultimate paradox 
of such symbohzIng gestures is that SOciety is held together by 
these very transgressIOns that appear on trash television which 
paradoxically prevent any form of society's closure in;o som~ 
harmonious whole where violence has been eliminated. In other 
word~, the very a~sence of a harmonious society acts as a spectral 
appanl10n (as ThIng) enabling every confessed '''immoral act" 
as ~et another failed attempt to achieve a peaceful harmonious 
lOVIng world. ~or.al panic rests, therefore, on an impossibility, an 
unfathomable hmlt that cannot be objectivized, located in what 
Lacan calls the Real, a space that is beyond language. Taken 
togethe.r, t.hese. confessional acts point beyond language to a 
bond hnk~ng ItS members together and implying a shared 
~elatlOnshlp WIth such an impossibilily. However, what is 
Important about this confessional practice is that it is the act that 
is most important "-and not the evidence or the penalties rhat 
go along with the confession (e.g., the banal penance given to 
confessants by priests for what appear to be grievous sins). The 
confession assures the stability of the social order (i.e., the 
recognition of the Big Other)." The self-incriminating subject 
. 24 I am referring to Lacan's development of the Thing as that element 
which holds together a given community, but which cannot be reduced to a 
point of symbolic identification. A detailed elaboration of this notion of the 
Thingcan be found in Jacques Lacan, Tlte ElhicsofPsycilOanalysis, 1959·1960, 17,. 
Semmar of 'acques Lacan, book 7, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (London: Routledge/ 
Travistoci<; 1992). "'" 
" Here I refer to ~)avoJ Zlzek. s readmgof Ideology as developed in his 
The Spectre of Ideology. See Mappmg Ideology, ed. Slavoj Zizek (London & 
New Yor~i; Verso, 19941, p. 21. . . . 
. .. The, necessity of speculanty and Its entertamment value is what 
fmally dId m PhIl Donahue. His ratings could no longer keep up with the more 
sensati0"1'J talk shows. . . 
!'-nother psycho~nalyt/(:: terll1: wh.lch refers to Jflcgues Lacan 'scli1im 
that what gIves force to the mstJtutlOnahzatloll of the law is a symbolic order 
that is already in place. 
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on talk-TV makes a double suggestion through his or her public 
confession, presenting the audience with the paradox of both an 
identification, as well as a distantiation: first, the confessional 
experience makes it appear that the guest is just like us with a 
similar moral structure as to what is right and wrong, and 
second: how the guest is so utterly different than us because of 
what he or she has been through. In this way both the horrors 
and mundane problems become the extreme limits of the 
confessional discourse. With horrors, the limits of the social are 
not contested; the Thing as spectral apparition is confirmed 
beyond the level of language; whereas with trivial concerns, the 
viewer's position within or inside the social is made clear and 
solidified. 
TV talk-shows are, therefore, a cauldron for a society's 
psychic ills. The audience is usually seeded with members who 
themselves have gone through a similar crisis in their lives. It is 
not unusual, for example, on Oprah to invite guests who reflect 
the show's focus (i.e., AIDS "victims," child abuse sufferers, 
wives of convicted rapists, and so on). The distinction betwe~n 
invited guests and audience becomes blurred. Sally J.essle 
Raphael, for example, often invites a member from the audience 
to provide a summative analysis of what advice he ~r she would 
offer the invited couples to solve their domestIc disputes. The 
community of viewers on most talk-shows enters into a P?s.ition 
that approximates "citizenship" in as much as they partIcipate 
in the proceedings, even if their pa~ticip."tio~ is more ofte~ only 
as witnesses to the testimony that IS bemg given. Geraldo IS the 
exemplar here. Although most talk-shows are pre-recorded, 
usually there are "live" phone-in questions from the larger 
viewing audience at home (e.g. Donahue). These pre-recorded 
phone calls add to the actuality of t~e event, a.nd remforce the 
idea that the "critical problem" eXists In society as a whole, 
making it a common concern. An expert is usually called in to 
confirm the authenticity of the testimony, and how best then to 
"manage" it. Both Donahue and Sally followed this model. During 
this time, often traditional values of the nuclear family are 
reinstated, and the power of patriotism reconfirmed in 
establishing the nation as one big family. The host is never the 
expert, but plays more the role of a concerned citizen, mediator, 
and interlocutor, who brings guests and audience together. Of 
late, many of these talk show hosts, especially Sally Jesse Raphael, 
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but also Ricki Lake, have become catalysts for reuniting "lost" 
family members to reinstate a sense of "community," and to 
restore dispersed and dysfunctional families (e.g., dads and 
mothers who had abandoneq their children, adopted siblings in 
search of their "natural" families, runaway teenagers who want 
to come back into the fold, and so on). 
Geraldo, The Oprah Winfrey Show, Donahue, Sally Jesse Raphael, 
Jenny Jones, Ricki Lake, the defunct Morton Downy, Jr. Show (a 
latenightexception) to name the most popular, help promote the 
spread of a social paranoia where no one is safe anywhere, not 
even in "small town" America. The Ricki Lake Show takes a 
quirky side to the youth crisis by having teenagers "confess" to 
each other how much they hate one another, or how confused 
they are concerning pregnancy, love, dating and other matters 
of the heart. Either way, teenagers come across as having a 
confused and bizarre set of values confirming that in a 
postmodern society adolescence is not a time of essential 
innocence, as it was portrayed in the modernist era, but that are 
all youth are essentially guilty. Supplementing this paranoia 
concerning youth are slick news shows like Hard Copy, PrimeTime, 
Inside Edition, the occasional 24 IJrs., and numerous television 
specials that focus on particular topics such as teen pregnancy, 
teen suicide, teen runaways, and teen prostitution. News 
magazines like Time, Atlantic, MacLeans and Newsweek, which 
represent the moral voice of white middle-class Americans and 
Canadians, regularly run feature articles on the youth crisis 
which further fuel the fears of a more mobile, middle-to-upper 
conservative class who keep themselves informed of current 
events through these magazines. 28 
28 Examples include: Atlantic's cover, "Growing Up Scared" (Karl 
Zinsmeister, June, 1990); Time's cover, "The Deadly Love Affair Between 
America's Youth and Firearms" Uon D. Hull, "A Boy and His Gun," 1993); 
Newsweek's cover, "Teen Violence: Wild in the Streets" (Barbara Kantrowitz, 
"Wild in the Streets," 1993); Time's cover "Our Violent Kids" (Anastasia 
Toufexis, June, 1989); David Ansen's "The Kid's Aren't Alright: A Powerful 
Portrait of Deadly, Disaffected Teens, Newsweek, June 1. The German equiva. 
lent, Der Spiegel and the Austrian equivalent, Profil have been reporting on the 
same "youth crisis" with equally vivid front cover designs. 
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Boomer Nostalgia and Xers Counter-Nostalgia 
The moralizers who have articulated the moral panic against 
the X Generation are Baby-boomers, those 35 years and older 
who are over-represented in society." Here a nostalgia for a 
childhood they remember can sometimes bring about some 
rather comically naive results. In April of 1992, for instance, the 
Toronto Globe and Mail carried a story about a Vancouver 
elementary school in the suburb of Coquitlam where a group of 
parents introduced skipping, marbles, and balls to children 
twice a week during recess because they felt that these children 
had an impoverished playing culture by watching too much 
television.30 With the institutionalization of charter schools 
wherein parents have a direct say in the school's curriculum 
more regressive measures such as this one can be expected. 
Tipper Gore's" book, Raising PG Kids in an X-Rated Society, is 
another exemplar in this regard. Her action to have a warning 
label (an X-rating) placed on record albums at the Parents' 
Music Resource Center hearings participates in the same 
simplistic copy-cat logic. This ideology of Boomer protection is 
perhaps best exemplified by The Children's Defense Fund, the 
Center for Humanities and Guidance Associates (a rhetorically 
impressive sounding title) who offer North American teachers a 
flood of slickly produced and moralistic videos for the school 
market. The catalogue for Guidance Associates lists over five 
hundred filmstrips, slide series and video tapes on topics from 
29 See Neil Howe and Bill Strauss, 1993 for demographic evidence. As 
an academic book, Alan Bloom's The ClOSing of tile American Mind'(New York: 
Simon & Shuster, 1987), which trashed the X Generation, went on to be an 
unprecedented bestseller, eagerly read and heralded by conservative Boomers 
as the definitive statement as to what's wrong with America. Bloom took his 
thesis on the road (included was the European circuit as well), arguing from 
campus to campus that the Western canon was in sore need of rehabilitation. A 
few years later, his student Francis Fukuyama wrote The End of History and the 
Last Man to vindicate Bloom"s thesis that the young will never know "true" 
beauty, have "true" passion or possess "true" beliefs. 
30 Kathleen McDonnell, Kid Culture: Children & Adults &. Popular 
Culture (Toronto: Second Story Press, 1994), pp. 38-39. 
31 (Nashville, TN.: Abingdon Press, 1987). She is the wife of the 
American vice~president Al Gore. 
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drug abuse to "values clarification," all stressing a prescriptive 
and normative ideology." 
" 
The New Rig~t Boomers read Generation X as being 
d~n.gerous, caught In a web of nihilism, delinquency and a 
f31h~g s.chool system." They fear that there will be an imperfect 
~ephcatlOn of the social order which disguises an economic 
Ideology that ~m",rica (and Canada) are unable to compete 
economIcally WIthin an international market. In other words 
youth are not economically productive enough-early enough: 
Post-adolescence breeds anomie and discontent because the 
work ethic has been lost. Comparisons are made with the 
country which currently spearheads capitalism: Japan, where 
~hildren attend.school?43 days of the year versus the 180 days 
In North Amenca. ThIS perception of a problematic youth is 
further complicated by Boomers on the Left who claim that they 
need a critical education having themselves been the product of 
student unrest and the "greening of America."" While not 
advocating traditi.ons of .the f~mily and patriotism, they push 
for .gre~ter educ~tlOnal dIverSIty (Le., multiplural curriculums, 
anlIraclst educatIOn, and the need for feminist issues and queer 
studies). Relying mainly on French poststructuralist theories 
d~veloped by Derrida, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Lacan, Althusser, 
lngaray and Cixous they can be distinguished from a residual 
layer of "Old Left" Boomers who take their lead from the 
Frankfurt School of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno who 
. 32 David Trend, The Crisis of Meaning in ClIltllreand Edllcation (London 
and Mm~~apohs: The UniverSity of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 30. 
I~ 13th Generatron . .. (pp. 25-28) some 50 quotes of denigration for 
the X generatIon are presented by prominent and outspoken Boomers from a 
broad ~ross.section of society (e.g., the Hudson Institute, U.S. Secretary of 
Edu~ahon , La~ar Alexander, Alan Bloom, Paul Hirsh, Louis Gerstnt'r, Jr. 
PreSident, Am~ncan Express, Arthur Levine, president of Bradford College, 
Fortune ~4gazme, Erroll McDonald, the executive editor, Pantheon Books). 
. Here, not only ~o I point to myself, but such educators as Henry 
Glroux,.Peter MacLaren, Mlchale Apple, Geoff Whitey, & Patti Lather, who 
wnte ~nt~cally of !he s~hool system, but have little to offer by way of concrete 
pres~npt~ve praxIs bemg more SOciologists than classroom teachers. (The 
allUSIOn IS to Charles A. Reich's book, The Greening of America (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1971)) . 
.. - ••• e •••. e •• ~ _____________________ _ 
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described a "culture industry" wherein the masses were 
systematically duped into lives of servitude and consumption. 
Adorno, in particular, defined high culture as a standard of 
excellence, as the best society had to offer, consequently it could 
not be readily understood or consumed by the masses. He saw 
youth culture as a logical product ~f p~stwarmedia. ~he "gesture 
of adolescence" for him was that which raves for this or that on 
one day with the ever-present possibility of damning it as idiocy 
the next."" Generation X is thereby squeezed by both sides of 
the Boomer political spectrum who both bring their own brand 
of nostalgia for the "good old days" that make Generation X's 
own culture unable to compare to it. They are simply not good 
enough, not critical enough, or not hard working enough. 
Like the comeback tell-tale sign of the pony-tail for Boomer 
men, Boomer disposable incomes have defined a mobile and 
aging youth culture. As these 196~s rock and r?llers .become 
grandparents it appears that youth IS a state that IS available to 
everyone of any age. The difference between "real youth" 
(Generation X) and this "juvenilization" becomes marked as 
being doubly problematic: not only is Generation X very "young" 
(i.e., immature), but they are also unable tocompare to the youth 
culture as authenticated by baby-boomer desire. The result of 
this discrimination has resulted in two very different senses of 
nostalgia. Generation X has tried to develop their own culture-
an ahistorical nostalgia that reaches back to the '50s as a way of 
critically reacting to Boomer criticism; while the baby-boomers 
recover the "golden" nostalgia of their own time." An example 
of Generation X critical nostalgia would be Tim Burton's Edward 
Scissorhands (1990) which takes place in any '50s suburb, U.S.A. 
where all the houses are designed the same way, painted in the 
same garish candy-colored colors which clash; where all the cars 
are American and mid-sized, and where all the streets are 
spanking clean and totally empty. In the morning all the men 
35 Theodor W. Adorno, Prisms. Trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber 
(London: Neville Spearman, 1967), p. 128. . . 
36 The descent into nostalgia with its accompamed emergence of the 
pastiche style (instead of parody) is often attributed, to Fredric Ja~e~on'~, now 
famous essay, "Postmodernism, Or the Cultural LogiC of LateCapltallsm, New 
Left Review, 146, 1984:53-92. 
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leave for work at the same time in their cars which magically 
appear from automatic garage doors which all open at the same 
time. The housewives settle down to gossip, eat, play bridge, 
watch daytime TV, and do routine housework, dressed in 
leggings, hair-rollers, bed-jackets and garish clothes. In this 
bucolic seen/scene Burton situates the Generation X teenager-
Edward-a freak born with scissors for hands, who believes in 
love and the homespun platitudes of Kim's father (Kim narrates 
the story and is Edward's primary love interest) ideas regarding 
laissez-faire capitalism, and the American dream. However, when 
Edward turns his handicap into a success story (i.e., he becomes 
a hair-designer and garden landscape artist extraordinare) the 
entire neighborhood eventually turns against him, showing the 
underlying savagery of Boomer middle America. Refusing the 
sexual advances of Mrs. Monroe, and then set-up for committing 
a robbery by the local rich-boy-cum-bigot, all of a sudden Edward 
finds himself refused by the bank for financial support, shunned 
by the entire neighborhood, and labeled a rapist and a criminal." 
In a similar sense, Robert Zermeckis's Back to the FlItllre (1985) 
places the hero in an "Ozzie and Harriet" image of 1950s America 
populated by ridiculous and Simplistic cardboard figures. In 
such films the narrative no longer exists in a linear time, but is 
marked by an ahistorical frozen moment that is played like a 
never ending loop. Likewise a film like Michael Lehmann's 
Heathers (1989) is a pastiche-filled teen film that pokes fun at the 
nihilism that Generation X is said to wallow in." 
37lnmuch the same way David Lynch's Bille Velvet (1989) presents the 
middle American town of Lumberville with its Matisse-like cut out houses, 
white picket fences, perfect green lawns and flowers, as a veneer for the seedy 
side of life that goes on behind its facade. Burton's more recent film, A Night 
Before Chris/mas (1994), an animation story which blends Halloween and 
Christmas into a quirky mix, can also be read from a similar point of view (Le., 
there is a kernel of horror at the very pit of the most festive time of the year). 
More recently, Burton has produced Batman, Forever Ooel Schumacher, 1995) 
which can be read as a reworking of the post-war Batman series along 
deconstructive lines where two sides of identity are put into flux. As in the 
previous Batman film, which revealed his sinister side, Batman;s frailties are 
once more exposed. Finally, Burton's most recent film, Ed Wood (1995), the 
"worst" director ever to grace Hollywood, is almost a standing joke for what 
Hollywood represents! 
38 Jon Lewis, Ti,e Road to Romance and Ruin: Teen Films and YOl/tll 
Culture (New York and London: Routledge, 1992). 
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These nostalgia films are far more critical than the golden 
nostalgia films of Boomer teen films that try to reassert traditional 
values, or which rework '50s teen films with a similar intent, 
(i.e., to diffuse any perceived threat to the conventional order 
posed by constant teen transgression). The romantic comedies 
of Boomer John Huges" present simple class issues in thecontext 
of a high school rigidly organized according to clique~ (i..e., t~e 
wealthy vs. the outsiders). The message throughout his films IS 
that girls have to wait until the end of adolescence (at graduahon) 
to fulfill their desires of true love while boys graduate into adult 
commitment of a job and family. His films present the 
contentiousness of youth as being normal; this "everyday" banal 
delinquency, according to Hughes, is overwhelmingly white, 
heterosexual, and middle class.'o The Breakfast Club (1985), for 
instance, is composed of hand-me-down stereotypes from various 
generic teen pics: the brain, the athlete, the basket case, the 
princess, the criminal. Nowhere in Hughes' film~ is th.ere any 
attempt to deal with the reality of adolescents cop 109 With theIr 
gay or lesbian identifications within a dominant heterosexual 
society. The Breakfast Club is outright homophobic in this regard. 
Boomer nostalgia remakes like Francis Coppola's Peggy 
Sue Got Married (1986), which celebrates a social immobility, the 
logic that who one is, is somehow a destiny; George Lukas' 
American Graffiti (1973), which attempted to be a comment on 
American youth on the edge of the Vietnam era, ended up be~ng 
a tribute to the Kennedian era; the films of Ron Howard, like 
Backdraft, Cocoon, Far and Away, and Apollo 13, which present an 
over-romanticized, exaggerated heroic view of America that 
never was, and Steven Spielberg (E. T., Jurassic Park, Hook, Casper, 
Indian Jones series) who has rejuvenated the comic book into 
39 Sixteen Candles (1984),Prellyin Pink (1986), The Breakfast Club (1985), 
Some Kind of Wonderful (1987), and Ferris Bueller's Day Off(1986}. 
40' In an examination of six of Hughes' films by Mariarnne Whatley, 
she found that only two of his films had men of color. Both were linked to sexual 
issues. One film involved a secondary character, a Chinese exchange student 
named Long Due Dong. The pornographical pun on his name was used 
throughout the film. In the second, indirect references to penis size and sexual 
power of African- American men were used. See her, "Raging Hormones ~nd 
Powerful Cars: The Construction of Men's Sexuality in School Sex Education 
and Popular Adolescent Films," JOllrnal of Education 170, no. 3 (1988): 100-121. 
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filmic form, present the force of Hollywood's Boomer all/ellrs 
who have defined the '!,ostalgia landscape. The nostalgia of the 
above films are not linked together by the similarity of their 
narrative structures as they are by the values they celebrate: a 
time where family, community spirit, and hard work made 
America great; a time when "good, clean'~ comic books were 
read and kids attended Saturday matinees to watch their heroes 
in action. The quintessential television series of Boomer 
moralizers, however, was Happy Days (and spin offs like Laverne 
and Shirley). Here the '50s came alive through the banality of the 
Cunningham family. Ron Howard (who also played Opie on the 
"apple-pie" series The Andy Griffith Show) was cast as the good 
boy Richie opposite bad boy Fonzie, the leather-jacketed biker. 
Whereas Marlon Brando (Laslo Benedek's The Wild One, 1954) 
and James Dean (Nicholas Ray's Rebel Withollt a Calise, 1955) 
were taken as "serious" delinquents, Fonzie eventually became 
part of the "all middle-American Cunningham family," his 
delinquency becoming a badge of respectability and conformity. 
More blatant Boomer displays of the kind of nostalgic 
educational system they want to see return are represented by 
such populist films as Stand and Deliver (Ramon Menendez, 
1988) and John Avildsen's Lean on Me (1989). Here the tactics of 
surveillance (through tracking), tough talk and tough love, 
"rote" learning, and the discipline of "hard work," are presumed 
to be the appropriate measures to assure adolescent 
development. Lean on Me, which was based on the principal, Joe 
Clark, roaming the halls of a New Jersey high school wielding a 
baseball bat, is instructively blatant in this regard.· ' Morgan 
41 A threateningjoe Clark holding a baseball bat appeared on the front 
cover of Time Oanuary 1988), while Stand and Deliver was reported to be 
President Reagan's favorite film. (See also Andrew Britton, "Blissing Out: The 
Politics of Reaganite Entertainment/' Movie, Vols. 31 /32, 1985.) These films are 
in the tradition of the prototype school problem film: Richard Brooks' The 
Blackboard Jungle, 1955. (To Sir with Love was the British remake.) The Blackboard 
'lingle was a graphic depiction of the growing juvenile delinquency problem in 
the '50s. It was censored in several states and so to stop the uproar a disclaimer 
was attached to the beginning of the film stating that America had a sound 
school system, but it was necessary to make the public aware of the rising 
concern over juvenile delinquency. The spoof of such films was Teachers 
(Arthur Hiller, 1984). 
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Freeman, as Joe Clark, popularized the New Right's ideal of a 
black American getting tough with other black Americans: the 
vigilante administrator who took matters into his own hands. 
There is a remarkable contrast made between the good old days 
and the bad new days of East Side High School in Paterson, New 
Jersey at the very beginning of the film. Kids are seated in rows, 
competing in spelling-bees, desperately and enthusiastically 
waving their hands because they want to give the answer and be 
recognized by the teacher. Morgan Freeman is presented as a 
young enthusiastic civil rights teacher, firing up his kids to the 
virtues of American democracy and its dream for equality and 
the good life. These scenes fade away as the halls fill with 
"grungy-looking" punk teens, moving chaotically about-
pushing and shoving; lockers and walls are now covered with 
graffiti; there is loud discordant music blaring over the school's 
loudspeakers. This stark contrast succinctly captures the populist 
imagination of what schools were like then and now. New Right 
Boomer nostalgia covers up the memory of sex, drugs, and rock 
& roll with abstinence, coca-cola, and golden oldies, and then 
says that these have been replaced by AIDS, crack, punk and 
Rap. 
The adult Boomer disciplinary gaze through the teenage 
film pic is cast in yet two other ways. First, is the accusation that 
general social apathy and boredom are attributed to the spoils of 
a middle-or-upper class. The classic example here is Bret Easton 
Ellis's Less than Zero (1985), a story about the apathy of upper-
class Los Angeles youth. The division between absent adults 
and affectless youths is repeated here. Besides the failure of the 
family, the abuse of class power is an attributing cause. Rich 
kids in this scenario have been "spoilt rotten." They have too 
much money and free time which is spent in the fast lane (Le., 
drugs, sex, and fast cars). Julian (Robert Downey, Jr.) requires 
excesses of excitement (through drugs) before he can "feel" 
anything. Second is the redeeming idea that despite the worst 
depravities kids can commit, there is always hope, and such 
hope is always presented as a heroic struggle. Thus, in The 
Basketball Diaries (Scott Kalvert, 1994), Oscar, (played by 
Leonardo DiCaprio). who is totally heroin dependent, pulls 
himself out of the gutter and becomes a New York "confessory" 
poet. In The Thing Called Love (Peter Bogdanovich, 1994), which 
has the additional distinction of featuring the James Dean look-
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alike. River Phoenix ,,:ho died of a drug overdose (confirming 
the h~mg fast and dymg young scenario), Miranda (Samantha 
Mat~ls) must learn thakto make it in Nashville as a singer, she 
requtres perseverance and personal heartache before her songs 
can "~ean:' ~nything (Le., sound "authentic" and "from the 
heart ). ThiS IS not unlike Ben Stiller's Reality Bites (1993) which 
tells the X Generation that it's a tough world out there so they 
had ~etter :tart their jobs wherever and whenever they can 
des pile their (over) qualifications." 
Family"Matters" 
New Right Boomers highly overestimate the traditional 
nuclear family .. Its ideal representation in the "golden days" of 
Boomer televlslO.n (<;.g., The Andy Griffith Show and Happy Days) 
make the recent filmiC spoof of '70s television series, The Partridge 
FamIly (Betty Tho.mas, 1994), so ridiculously funny, while 
schmaltzy cele.bratlOns of the family in films like A Dog Called 
B.ee.thoven (Bnan Levant, 1992) make it appear "funnily" 
ndlculous. In the New Right's search for a nostalgia of authority, 
many teen films attempt to make teenage anomie a result of a 
dysfunctional family (i.e., the presence of a weak or absent 
fat~er and ~ working and, therefore uncaring mother).' 3 The 
qumtessentlal movie in this regard has been Tim Hunter's River's 
42D· h 
unng t e International Youth Year 1980, the General Conference 
of UNESCO in Belgrade produced a comprehensive report entitled, Youth in the 
19805, ,":hlCh characterized the coming decade as one that was going to be one 
of s~arclty, unemployment, underemployment, ill-employment, anxiety, de-
fenSiveness, pragmatIsm, and even subsistence and survival. In Charles Acland, 
p.3. 
43 This is brilliantly developed by Vivian Sobchack, "Child/ Alien/ 
Fat~e~: Patnarc~al Cri~i~ and Generic Exchange." In Close Encounters: Film, 
FeminIsm and SCIence FIctIOn. Constance Penley, Elisabeth Lyon, Lynn Spigel, 
and Janet Bergstrom, eds. (Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Minnesota 
Pre~s, 1991), pp. 3-30. Sobchack shows how the embattered bourgeois nuclear 
famIly has been portrayed by the coming together of the SF, horror, and family 
melodramas genr~s during the '80s and early '90s. These three genres attempt 
to restore the famIly by working out in a conservative fashion the narrative 
reso.Jution to th~ ~ontemporary weakening of patriarchal authority, and the 
~Iartng contr~dlctlons which exist between the mythology of the family rela-
tions and theIr actual social practice. 
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Edge (1987) which represents the spectacle of wasted youth and 
youth gone wild. The story is loosely based on a murder that 
took place in Milpitas, California in 1981. It tells the story of a 
young man (Samson) who strangles his girlfriend (Jamie) for no 
apparent reason. He then invites his friends to view her nak~d 
body which he has necrophilicly violated. The teenagers re~c~ In 
a confused and emotionless manner. No one reports the kIlltng 
to the police; they do not seem to be able to grasp the tragedy of 
their friend's death, nor the reprehensibility of the murder. The 
story raises the question how such anesthetization is possible. 
These deadened and apathetic youths, like the girl's body by the 
river's edge, are like the "living dead." In a Lacanian 
psychoanalytic sense, they are in need of a "second death." The 
film presents the teenager as someone who demands a proper 
burial for, as they are, they cannot find a proper place in the 
symbolic order." In other words the "living dead youth" insist 
that something be done, otherwise they will continue to "haunt" 
adults. Throughout the film teenage dysfunctionality is 
attributed to parental neglect." The traditional family has been 
carnaged. It is the parents who have put their children in t~is 
living hell by shirking theirresponsibility. Youth and adults ltve 
in separate worlds. The adults in River's Edge .exist in e.xclusi~ely 
closed locations. Mothers are presented as dIsembodIed VOIces, 
or always leaving for work with no time to interact with the~r 
children; fathers are non-existent, or as step-dads they don t 
44 The idea of Lacan's notion of a "second death" can be found in 
Slavoj Zizek's Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular 
Culture (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: the MIT Press, 1991), pp. 22-
23. The film is scattered with the symbolism of the "living dead" and "hfeless 
women," pushing it in the direction of the horror genre. Besi~es.t~e dead b~y 
of Jamie, there is Tim's "killing" of his sister's doll by droppmg It mto the flver 
from a bridge, and the "killing" of Ellie, Feck's "girlfriend," a blow-up seX doll 
at the end of the film. 
45 What is rare is to attribute teenage anomie and evilness to some 
geneticdefect(e.g., Tile Good Son [Joseph Rubin, 1993] starringMa~aulayCulkin 
as Henry Evans,or Mickey [Dennis Dirnster-Denk, 1992]) because It subverts the 
cultural faith in the inherent goodness of the child. More prevalent are posses-
sionfilms where the child is an empty vessel for the entry of evil (e.g., Richard 
Donner's Omen, 1976; The Lost Boys, Joel Schumacher, 1987). A film like Junior 
(Dennis Dugan, 1990) makes more of the prank tendencies of childhood than 
dwelling on inherent evilness. 
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care; or they sit alone in the dark watching TV, oblivious to their 
kids' coming and goings. 
''''> 
Mother bashing is particularly prevalent in Boomer 
moralizing films. Variations of Kramer vs. Kramer are continually 
played over and over again with the male parent often exempt 
from any wrong doing" In one of the latest remakes, it is Robin 
Williams who is able to be the better "mom." In Mrs. Doubtfire 
(Chris Columbus, 1994) it is the wife who has neglected the kids 
because of her position as an executive in a design firm, yet the 
courts have awarded her custody of the children. The father is 
presented as "just wanting to have fun," a big kid at heart. In 
perhaps the most hyperbolic form possible of parent bashing, 
Home Alone (Chris Columbus, 1990) presents viewers with the 
ridiculous scenario that parents had actually forgotten one of 
their children in the rush and confusion to visit relatives in 
another state. Such neglect points to actual cases where single 
working class moms have left their two year olds at home alone 
because they could not afford baby sitters. The question is not 
one of neglect, as much as it is one that is due to a desperate 
economic situation. The solution to the troubled household 
Sobchack47 argues, was provided by Spielberg'S E. T. (1982): an 
extraterrestrial became a surrogate dad-a transported and 
transformed father and friend to children of single parent 
households: the culturally-embraced phrase, "E.T. phone home" 
held a deep resonance for a patriarchy in distress. 
Girlie Culture 
To come back full circle, Tank Girl is an especially 
46 Dustin Hoffman is i'innocent" in Kramer vs. Kramer, after all, his 
wife walked out on him! This trend is part of what Susan Faludi would claim 
tobe the backlash against feminism. See The Men Strike Back: The Undeclared War 
on American Women (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1991). 
47 Sobchack writes, "Physically androgynous yet paternal in function, 
adult, wise, and wizened, yet an innocent, childish, little 'wise guy'; technologi-
cally and personally powerful, yet a vulnerable little victim of circumstance-
E.T. physically escapes traditional patriarchal form witlJOut yielding traditional 
patriarchal power, and thus is able to reside in (terrestrial) domestic space and 
serve as Elliot's surrogate father" (p. 20). 
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bothersome film r I>r Doomer moralizers since it flies in the face 
or moral norms which characterize a discourse of nationalism 
obsessed with the rhetoric of a "national family," and the sanctity 
of its procreative capacities. The "motherland" collapses the 
home and country into a domestic theme. The metaphor of 
woman-as-nation presents the female personality as being chaste, 
dutiful and maternal." To produce such an image it becomes 
necessary to construct and promote a normative national 
subjectivity for young women (i.e., one of goodness and high 
morality). All kinds of coercive rhetorical tricks are mobilized to 
do this." Adolescent sexuality as surveyed and controlled by 
adult boomers is especially blind to the realities of teenage 
lifestyles. Sex education classes rarely discuss the dangers to 
adolescents caused by abusive adults. Films about teenagers 
written by adults such as House Party, Risky Business, Weird 
Science, Cooley High, rarely mention AIDS; contraceptives are 
almost never mentioned; pregnancy is rarely a fear; while 
lesbianism is virtually invisible. The main danger of sexuality 
emphasized in such films is the danger of being caught by 
adults, especially parents.50 While I am not advocating a return 
to some naive social realist aesthetic such exclusions need to be 
48 Mother's Day was created as a way of reunifying a divided nation 
after the U.s. Civil War (Thanks to an unknown reviewer for this insigh!!). 
49 The Children's Defense Fund collapses HIV contagion with teen 
pregnancy. Both are equated as being amoral sexual practices so that restraint 
from sexual practice is insured; both are referred to as crisis conditio~ and 
epidemics. Sexuality and homosexuality are collapsed together metaphOrIcally 
and literally with illness, crime, humiliation, poverty and death. See Lorame 
Kenny, "The Birds and the Bees: Teen Pregnancy and the Media," Afterimage 16, 
1 (Summer 1988): 6-8. Another approach has been to use scare tactics about the 
risks of pregnancy and dangers of contraception in so-called abstinence-based 
curricula, more appropriately called "antisex curricula" by some. See Bonnie 
Trudell and Mariamne H. Whatley, "Sex Respect: A Problematic School Sexu-
ality Curriculum," JOllrnal Of Sex Education and Therapy 17, no. 2 (1991): 125-140. 
A further tactic in many textbooks used for adolescent sex education has been 
to include a photograph of a pregnant teenage girl after presenting "innocent" 
and "playful" images of teenagers: the "before" and "after" effects if abstinence 
is not practiced. See Mariamne H. Whatley, "Keepmg Adolescents In the 
Picture: Construction of Adolescent Sexuality in Texbook Images and Popular 
Films." In Sexual Cultures and the Construction of Adolescent Identities, ed. Janice 
M. Irvine \fhiladelphia: Temple University Press), pp. 183-205. 
5 Whatley, p. 191. 
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mentioned. Nostalgia reigns. The nostalgia for such a fictional 
past is projected by profamily themes of New Traditionalist 
advertising such as "the newinorality," "the new abstinence, " 
"the new femininity," "the new baby boom, and "the return to 
the good girl."" The New Traditionalist ethos of nostalgic 
America directly links the idealized working mother to the 
idealized motherland. Good HOllsekeepingpresented Barbara Bush 
as the ideal example of this New Traditionalist trend linking 
idealized images of women and families with patriotism and 
national pride. Barbara Bush is certainly not representative of 
the Boomer generation; however, she acts more in the capacity 
of a grandmother who is showing the way for Boomer stars like 
Sally Field and Diane Keaton who have also appeared on its 
cover. The nation signifies a home and its citizens as one 
gigantic family governed by benevolent patriarchs like the late 
Alan Bloom who was pessimistic about the possibility of youth 
ever being capable of exercising reason other than one wedded 
to their own self-interests. 
Given this set of values the" girlie culture'" 2 is particularly 
upsetting because it also encompasses the worst nightmares of 
postfeminism. It presents a strata of women who are the very 
antithesis of patriotic idealism. In a review article on 
postfeminism in both American and Germanic contexts Der 
Spiegel" identified these young women as "Emmas Tochter"-
the daughters of emancipated woman. They are described as 
being strong, clever, egotistical, sensitive, self-confident, and 
very feminine; a good girl on the outside, but bad on the inside: 
"Lolitas who kick like Bruce Lee." "Not to be treated like a piece 
of shit," is the best advice she learnt from her mother, says 
Girlie-model Kate Moss. (Boys are said to be just the opposite: 
bad on the outside, good in the inside.) A picture in the article 
features a girl standing with her hand on her hips. On one side 
of her arm is written "witch," on the other, "slut" Emmas 
51 Rosemary Hennessy, Materialist Feminism and lite Politics of Dis-
course (New York and London: Routledge, 1993). 
52 See Stefan Gyongyosi, "Girl oder Grrrl," Medien JOllrnal2 (1995): 
44-51. 
53 Der Spiegel, "Die Bombe von Nebenan," No. 47 (Nov. 21, 1994): 
104-117. 
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Tiichters have their own magazines (e.g., Sassy in the US, Planet 
Pussy in Germany); their own style of dress-" girliewear;" their 
own music-"Girlsm"; their own stars (e.g., Madonna) and a 
comic, Tank Girl, (which has now been filmed). Magazines and 
books promote their slogans like: "Be a beast," "Good girls go to 
heaven, bad girls go everywhere," and "Get fit, get rich, get 
laid" (Madonna). 
Postfeminist girls call themselves" girlies" or "babes." They 
are furtheridentified as a generation 15-25 years old who demand 
equal wages for the same work, and believe that they have the 
same life chances to get ahead. They have accepted the 
achievements of feminism as a precondition for their own 
lifestyle." It is Hollywood's "Jazz Babes" who provide the 
"right stuff" for these girls, having made their careers from their 
"baby images": BarbaraStanwyck,Joan Crawford, Jean Harlow, 
but also Holly Golightly of Breakfast at Tiffany's, Winona Ryder 
and Uma Thurman. What troubles the New Right is that such 
characters are appearing more and more in films and in children's 
television. The She-Ra doll began to appear in the mid-eighties 
competing with Barbie, and since 1992 "girlie action figures" 
have been introduced in Saturday morning television programs." 
If the paternal superego is breaking down and the maternal 
superego is becoming more prevalent, it may well be that the 
symbolic law of the father is being replaced by rules of knowing 
how to succeed.56 The "girlie" lifestyle embraces the Madonna 
ego-ideal where it becomes important to know the rules of the 
game: how to manipulate people and the media, and how to 
54 Ibid, p. 116. Such an ideal ego is presented by 23 year-old cover girl 
model. Nadja Auermann, who comes across as a dangerous "big-city" Ama-
zon: "the bombshell next door," a complete contrast to thesupermodel Claudia 
Schiffer who is described by one 27 year-old interviewee as someone "who 
looks as she has been built by a man out of a child's construction kit." 
55 The programs include: X-Men (which is misnamed since the new 
series features four women out of the eight X-Men who are disciples of the 
disabled Professor Xavier), Cadillacs and Dinosaurs, Where in ti,e World Is Carmen 
Sandiego? and the Mighty Morphin Power Rangers. These shows feature buddy 
relationships between "girls" and the "boys"; heroes and heroines battle evil 
together. 
56 Zizek, pp. 102-103. 
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assume a variety of changeable roles. As another interview said, 
"Madonna is able to have fun, sex, million dollars, and besides 
this her own mind, and'besides this a shaven ass .... "" Her 
"girlie" followers radically conform to her lifestyle, yet 
paradoxically experience themselves as outlaws and rebels. 
Violence in Perspective 
The filmic biography of Tina Turner is a strong reminder 
that, despite her success, Turner was a victim of an abusive 
marriage. Violence remains largely a heterosexual male problem 
that is intimately tied up with sexual politics, the division of 
labor, and the social organization of sexuality and attraction. It 
is time to conclude this essay by putting societal violence in 
perspective. In this regard, Eleanor Lyon" has some remarkable 
observations about the content of American televised violence. 
The startling conclusion she makes is that there is a contradictory 
relationship between simulated violence on prime time television 
and the "real" violence on the streets, in the homes, and in the 
institutions. Who commits violence on television and who are 
its victims are in disparate discord with daily news reports. 
Televised violence is initiated by predominantly white, middle-
class males. Lyon's study showed that those classified as violently 
"good" were both female and upper class while those classified 
as violently "bad" tended to be lower class. Lyon also found that 
a larger percentage of upper-class females than upper-class 
males were violents. The number of non-white violents was far 
too small to make any sort of significant assessment in this 
analysis, however she notes, "there was not one 'good' Latino in 
the sample."" Victimization was equally dramatic. The data on 
victims revealed that women and upper-class characters were 
disproportionately vulnerable to violence, especially upper-
class women who were predominately "good" or "innocent 
victims." Lower-class characters (to a lesser extent men) were 
57 Der Spiegel, p. lIS. 
58 Eleanor Lyon, "Media Murderand Mayhem: Violence on Network 
Television." In Marginal Couvelltious: Poplliar Culture, Mass Media Q1td Social 
Deviance, ed. Clinton R. Sanders (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green State 
Universits. Popular Press, 1990), pp. 144-153. 
9 Ibid., p.147. 
74 jagodzillski 
more likely to be violents than victims who "deserve" violence 
because they were "bad." 
From this evidence Lyon draws several conclusions: 
First, there is a "virtual absence on television of minority 
members as both violents and victims" when it is well-known 
that "Black males have the highest victimization rates of any 
group. Further, the overwhelming majority of violent crimes is 
intraracial."60 Second, there is a disproportionate representation 
of the upper class as victims when the majority of known victims 
of violent crime come from the lower classes. Third, although 
family violence is pervasive, rarely are there any portrayals of 
wife battering and child abuse. Lyon's final concern is with the 
over exaggerated dangers of violence. With the exception of 
family violence, the televised incidents usually ended in death 
whereas in reality threats of physical injury are more the case. 
Lyon concludes with, 
Upper class violents are "good" characters, lower class 
violents are "bad." Lower class victims are "bad," and 
are likely to be killed, while upper class people are 
vulnerable, but not consequentially so. Women are 
more likely to be victimized by violence than to commit 
it, but their victimization is relatively harmless. Black, 
Latino and other minority group members are 
infrequently seen in violent incidents, but are seen 
more frequently as violents than as victims, thus 
removing them from public view as among the victims 
deserving sympathy and support. Family violence is 
infrequent and, when it occurs, is relatively without 
impact. Finally, television violence disproportionately 
leads to death." 
NotWithstanding the methodological problems of her 
study," such results do suggest a paranoia by the middle-to-
60 Ibid .. pp. 149-150. 
61 Ibid., pp.151-152. 
62 Although Lyon's study is short term (i.e., her content analysis 
covers a time period of only several weeks) her conclusions compare favorably 
with the content analysis of such long term results collected at the University 
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upper classes towards the lower classes; a similar paranoia is 
targeted at pornography by the Moral Right. In other words, 
there is a denial and a repression of the acknowledgment that 
the underclasses who are unable to attain "the good life" commit 
most of the serious crimes in America. 
Lyon's study of simulated screen violence points to the 
relationship of violence and power, a couplet which is overlaid 
by sex, age, race, and class privilege in a capitalist SOciety, 
Symbolic violence is, therefore, an incarnation of unequal social 
relations, an indicator of the hegemonic struggle that is in 
process. John Fiske' 3 has explored how the clash of these popular 
symbolic violent bodies (heroes, heroines, villains, victims) are 
an incarnation of the "real" social body-the social relations of 
reproduction. Such violent images can be used in constructing 
social identities (Le., as if relationships in the imagination, with 
the potential of becoming antagonistic relationships to the social 
order). For example, girlie culture constructs an as if relationship 
against patriarchy to gain some forms of psychological 
empowerment (resistance), even if they are not, 'lin reality" 
empowered. Such identifications of resistance remain threatening 
to the dominant culture since an articulation of resentment 
towards the social order that oppresses them is always possible. 
Any change in the reproduction of the social imaginary 
can, therefore, have real effects. Fiske argues that the desire for 
violence needs to be understood within Ihe context of a growing 
gap between the privileged and the deprived which has increased 
since Reaganomic capitalism came into being. The axes along 
which violence is understood in any specific location depends 
on a particular combination of class, sex/ gender, age, and race. 
Not all these vectors may apply equally. For example, with girlie 
culture, age and gender are of central importance. As this essay 
of Pennsylvania's Annenberg School for Communication which has continued 
its Cultural Indicators project (CI) since 1967. For a comparative analysis see 
GeorgeGerbner's "~},!~vision Violence:The Power and the Peril," pp.551-552. 
63 John Fis~":"l he Body of Violence. "In his Power Plays, Power Works 
(London and Ne-;:.jYork: Verso. 1993). pp.124-144. 
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has argued, Generation X, which itself is splintered into various 
locations of class, race, and sex/ gender, is a special focus of the 
New Right's efforts to maintain and reproduce the social 
imaginary by delegitimating, regulating, repressing, or cajoling 
the youthful "bottom-up" culture. The taste for symbolic violence 
by Generation X culture comes from the social position they find 
themselves in-a subordinated position where there is a denial 
of the rewards (the American Dream of modernism) that the 
dominant rhetoric after the Second World War had promised 
them as their inherited right. This has resulted in a strange 
alliance between the capitalist commodification of youth culture 
and youths poaching this very commodified culture as forms of 
resistance for their own ends, as demonstrated, for instance, in 
their '50s antinostalgia films." The best way to reduce both 
physical and symbolic violence in today's postmodern society 
is, therefore, not to censor it, nor to introduce more "quality" 
programs (ersatz for educational programs); nor is it to moralize 
and rail against such images, rather the best way is to change the 
social conditions that produce the desire for its taste. In other 
words, the gap of privilege has to close if violence is to decre~se 
and the moral panic is exposed for what it hides: namely the fe,~r 
that those who are now privileged may stand to lose their status. 
On the very day that I end this essay, French youths are violently 
clashing with police in the poorest districts of Paris." The 
government's response has been to blame these disturbances on 
incoming American broadcasts of television violence. Their 
solution: introduce the V-chip technology into every television 
set in France! 
64 The refinement of such an argument can be found in the writings 
of Paul Willis, especially his Common Culture: Symbolic Work al Play in Ihe ' 
Everyday Cui lures of Ihe Young (Milton Keyes: Open University Press, 1990) 
where he develops the idea of "symbolic work" as creatively expressed by 
today's youth. Dick Hebdige's Subculture: The Meanillg of Slyle «London: 
Methuen, 1979) is an early precursor of the same argument. Youth's appropria-
tion of material culture reveals a dramatic "refusal," a stylized repudiation of 
adult culture that "in spectacular fashion (signals) the breakdown in consensus 
in the post-war period" (p.17). As part of the New Left, his thesis is an obvious 
challenge to the Frankfurt School of cultural analysis. A similar argument can 
be found from a broader perspective in Michel de Certeau, Tile Practice of 
Everyday Lit Trans. Steven F. Rendall (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1984). 
6 As reported on the CBC News, 20 February 1996. 
